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INTRODUCTION
Many criminal defendants are held in detention while they
await trial. Though conditions in pretrial detention are much like
those in prison, detention is technically not punishment. Since
detainees are merely accused of crimes, they are presumed innocent.'
Their detention is not intended to punish them, and so, the Supreme
Court has said, it is not punishment at all. 2 Rather, detention is a
means of promoting public safety, reducing witness intimidation, and
preventing people accused of crimes from fleeing before trial.
Nevertheless, defendants who are convicted generally receive
credit at sentencing for time served in pretrial detention.3 An offender
who deserves two years of incarceration as punishment will have his
sentence cut in half if he has already spent one year in detention.
Such offsets appear to conflict with principles of proportional
punishment. Taken literally, giving credit for time served leads us to
systematically underpunish detainees by reducing their punishment
by time spent unpunished. To unlock the mystery of credit for time
served, defenders of proportionality need to square the widely held
view that offenders should receive credit for time served with the
widely held view that punishment should be proportional to
blameworthiness.
One seemingly plausible solution that I suggest in Part I is to
modify our understanding of proportionality. Courts and legal scholars
sometimes draw too sharp of a distinction between formal punishment
and other harms inflicted by the state. On more careful reflection,
however, what they really seem to care about is not proportional
punishment but proportional "harsh treatment," which includes not
only the suffering and deprivation of formal punishment but also the
suffering and deprivation of "punishment look-alikes," like pretrial
detention. Even though pretrial detention is technically not
punishment, it is harsh treatment, and most people are inclined to
give offenders credit for it.
1. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
2. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987).
3. See infra Part I.C.
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Shifting to proportional harsh treatment, however, solves one
problem at the expense of several others. As I argue in Part II, once
we understand punishment severity in terms of harsh treatment
rather than a more neatly bordered but inaccurate construct like days
in prison, we must consider the actual amount of harsh treatment we
inflict.4 The amount will vary based on (1) the particular facilities to
which inmates are assigned, (2) how inmates experience those
facilities, (3) how confinement harms them relative to their
unpunished baselines, and (4) how they are affected by the collateral
consequences of incarceration for decades to come. Even if these
harms do not constitute punishment, they contribute to sentence
severity as surely as pretrial detention does.
While we could try to salvage proportional harsh treatment by
taking all of this variation into account, I argue in Part III that when
we look closely at proportional harsh treatment, it becomes much less
appealing and consequentialist punishment theories that do not
depend on proportionality look comparatively more appealing. Even
though retributivist notions of proportionality are central to
sentencing systems around the world and are widely thought to
undergird core notions of criminal justice, proportionality has
profoundly counterintuitive implications.
I. THE MYSTERY OF CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED
In this Part, I describe what I mean by proportional
punishment and how it conflicts with giving offenders credit for time
served. I then propose five responses proportionalists might offer to
reconcile the two policies. I argue that the best reconciliation requires
us to replace proportional punishment with the more general concept
of proportional harsh treatment.
A. Background on the Meaning of Punishment
In United States v. Salerno,5 the Supreme Court upheld the
federal statute that provides for pretrial detention of dangerous
4. In this Part, I connect and extend claims I made in Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective
Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009) [hereinafter Kolber, Subjective
Experience]; Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565
(2009) [hereinafter Kolber, Comparative Nature]; Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the
Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 622-48 (2011) [hereinafter Kolber, Experiential Future]; and Adam J.
Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2012) [hereinafter Kolber,
Unintentional Punishment].
5. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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offenders.6 Crucial to the Court's determination was its view that
Congress intended pretrial detention to be "regulatory" rather than
"punitive."7 What made the statute regulatory, first and foremost, was
that it was not intended to punish.8 Absent evidence that the
legislature expressly intended to punish, the Court only deems a
statutory provision punitive if it has no rational alternative purposes
or if the provision "appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purposes assigned [to it]."9 In essence, harsh treatment at the hands of
the state is only punishment if it is intended to punish or if claims to
the contrary seem implausible, even if the conditions of confinement in
pretrial detention are just as severe as those in prison. 1o
Many theorists share the Court's view that punishment must
generally be intended as such. H.L.A. Hart's widely cited definition of
standard cases of punishment requires that painful or unpleasant
consequences be "intentionally administered" to an "offender for his
offence."" David Boonin defends a particular interpretation of the
requirement that punishment be intended, stating that "[i]t is not
merely that in sentencing a prisoner to hard labor, for example, we
foresee that he will suffer. Rather, a prisoner who is sentenced to hard
labor is sentenced to hard labor so that he will suffer."12 Thus, even
though pretrial detention is supposed to protect us from dangerous
people and those likely to flee or intimidate witnesses,' it is
technically not punishment; detainees are presumed innocent and are
not intended to suffer or be deprived as condemnation for an offense.
6. Id. at 741. Under the statute, if an offender has committed certain serious crimes and a
judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person
before trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), (0 (2006).
7. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
8. Id.
9. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-
69 (1963)).
10. The Supreme Court considered it relevant that the federal statute requires detainees to
be held in a "facility separate, to the extent practicable, from" people who have been convicted,
id. at 748 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1342(i)(2)), but did not require that conditions in pretrial
detention be any less severe than those in prison.
11. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1968). Hart speaks of an "actual
or supposed" offender, but the inclusion of "supposed" likely refers not to accused people in
pretrial detention but to those who are erroneously convicted. See id. at 5-6.
12. DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 13 (2008); see also id. at 14 n.14 (citing
theorists who describe punishment as an infliction intended to harm).
13. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 583 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing risk of flight as a longstanding justification for pretrial detention).
1144 [Vol. 66:4:1141
2013] AGAINST PROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENT 1145
B. Background on Proportionality
The view that punishment should be proportional-at least in
some respect-is enormously popular, capturing the views of most
laypeople and probably most theorists. 4 According to Antony Duff,
some principle of proportionality is "intrinsic to any version of
retributivism."15 Even young children have proportional-punishment
intuitions.16 Reflecting these views, the almost-half-century-old Model
Penal Code was amended a few years ago to make proportionality the
centerpiece of its sentencing philosophy.17
Proportionality is often considered one of the biggest
attractions of retributivism relative to consequentialism. 8 Pure
consequentialists punish in order to promote crime deterrence and the
incapacitation and rehabilitation of dangerous people.' 9 Since we
might be able to prevent a great deal of crime by punishing some
relatively minor offense with an extremely long prison sentence,
disproportional punishment could, under certain circumstances, lead
to very good consequences. Therefore, pure consequentialists have no
14. BOONIN, supra note 12, at 35 ("Virtually everyone who has attempted to justify
punishment, for example, firmly believes that punishment should be at least roughly
proportionate to the severity of the offense."); PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE,
LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 157-99 (1995) (describing
surveys of laypeople that loosely reflect proportional-punishment intuitions).
15. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 132 (2001); see also Mary
Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
149, 164 (2010) ("Retributivism ... is centrally concerned with the imposition of punishment in
proportion to an offender's moral desert."); id. at 168 (describing proportionality as a
"fundamental retributive value 0").
16. Norman J. Finkel, Marsha B. Liss & Virginia R. Moran, Equal or Proportionate Justice
for Accessories? Children's Pearls of Proportionate Wisdom, 18 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 229, 241 (1997) (reporting that "by grades 2-3, [children] are making proportionate
judgments of culpability and handing out proportionate punishments to all defendants" in mock
scenarios).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1 2007); see also
Current Projects, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=projects.proj-ip&projectid=2 (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) ("Once approved by the
Council and membership, Tentative Drafts may be cited as representing the most current
iteration of the Institute's position until the official text is published.").
18. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 4 (2005) (stating that deterrence-oriented punishment policies pay
insufficient attention to proportionality); Sigler, supra note 15, at 170 ("Absent side constraints,
utilitarianism countenances the deliberate infliction of punishment on the innocent and
accommodates modes and methods of treatment that fail to accord with our basic sense of justice
and proportionality." (citation omitted)).
19. See C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 7-8
(1987).
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principled commitment to proportional punishment. 20 Retributivists,
by contrast, usually require proportional punishment and always
prohibit knowingly or recklessly punishing people in excess of what
they deserve.21
The kind of proportionality that I address in Part I and that I
ascribe to proportionalists says that offenders should be punished in
proportion to their blameworthiness. 2 2 My claims apply just as well to
common variations on this general formula: Some say that an
offender's punishment should be proportional to his "desert" or to the
"seriousness of his offense." 23 Some understand the seriousness of an
offense in terms of its illegality, others in terms of its immorality.24
Sometimes the expression "proportional punishment" is used
just to mean "appropriate" or "fitting" punishment. I have no quarrel
with proportionality when used in such a generic sense. My challenge
is to the view that as one's blameworthiness increases, so should one's
punishment. For example, some say that consequentialists are
committed to a principle of proportionality in the sense that
punishment should be "not more harmful than the harm it aims to
prevent."25 This is a very different notion of proportionality-if it can
even be called that-than the retributivist forms of proportionality
that I am addressing.
Some scholars hold "mixed" or "hybrid" theories of punishment
that are largely consequentialist in nature but use retributivist
principles of proportionality to limit the amount of punishment
20. Though consequentialists have no fundamental obligation to punish proportionally, as
an empirical matter, there may still be good instrumental reasons to do so. Kolber, Subjective
Experience, supra note 4, at 236.
21. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 6,
102 n.33 (2009). Some retributivists might require only that we never knowingly or recklessly
punish particular individuals in excess of what they deserve. This difference will not affect my
analysis, however.
22. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 169 (1985) ("Penalties should comport with
the seriousness of crimes, so that the reprobation visited on the offender through his penalty
fairly reflects the blameworthiness of his conduct.").
23. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 738-
39 (2009) (describing a variety of ways in which retributivist proportionality is described); see
also DUFF, supra note 15, at 135 ("Penal proportionality, as orthodoxly understood, is a relation
between the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the punishment."); Douglas N. Husak,
Already Punished Enough?, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 83 (1990) ("A corollary of the 'just deserts' theory
is the principle of proportionality, according to which the severity of a punishment should be a
function of the seriousness of the offense.").
24. See Kyron Huigens, The Jurisprudence of Punishment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793,
1816-17 (2007).
25. DUFF, supra note 15, at 132.
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imposed in particular cases.26 The "narrow proportionality principle"27
in the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution could be
understood as a cousin to such theories. Though the Constitution does
not require anything like precise proportionality, "[t]he concept of
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment" ban on cruel and
unusual punishment and "[e]mbodie[s] . .. the 'precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense.' "28
I address these more limited forms of proportionality in Part
III.A.2. In short, though, I argue that retributivist proportionality is
deeply troublesome and remains so whether it takes center stage or
merely has a supporting role. Moreover, I criticize proportionality
without resort to familiar arguments that it is difficult or impossible
to convert amounts of blameworthiness into amounts of punishment. 29
C. Background on Credit for Time Served
About half a million people are currently held in pretrial
detention in the United States.30 Even though pretrial detention is not
considered punishment, those who are subsequently convicted usually
have their sentences shortened by the amount of time they spent in
detention. Federal judges, for example, are required by statute to give
credit for time served, 31 as are many state judges. 32
26. On some such views, the general justifying aim of punishment is consequentialist (we
create institutions of punishment to prevent crime and rehabilitate criminals), but retributivist
principles of proportionality constrain the amount of punishment we are permitted to inflict on
individual offenders. See HART, supra note 11, at 8-13; Douglas Husak, Why Punish the
Deserving?, 26 NOtJs 447, 452-53 (1992) (describing Hart's view).
27. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 996 (1991)).
28. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
29. See, e.g., JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 148-49 (2004)
(critically analyzing efforts to establish which punishments are proportional to which levels of
blameworthiness).
30. According to the Bureau of Justice, approximately sixty-one percent of the 735,601
people held in local jails in the middle of 2011 had not been convicted of the crimes for which
they were charged. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 237961, JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011-STATISTICAL TABLES, at 4 tbl.1, 7 n.7 (2012).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2006).
32. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-98d (West 2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-100
(West 2012); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 880 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 33A
(West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-12 (West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(3) (McKinney
2013); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9760 (West 2012); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03 § 2
(West 2011).
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I focus primarily on pretrial detention, though offenders can
also receive credit for other periods of detention, including time during
trial and time after conviction but before sentencing. While pretrial
detention is often short, measured in days or months, it can also last
for years. A Chinese immigrant charged with manslaughter in New
York was recently released without trial after spending almost four
years in pretrial detention. 33 The International Criminal Court in The
Hague recently sentenced an offender to fourteen years of
incarceration minus the six years he spent in detention prior to trial
and sentencing. 34
When judges have broad sentencing discretion, it can
sometimes be difficult to determine whether an offender received
credit for time served. Suppose at sentencing that an offender has
already spent two months in detention and that the judge believes the
offender deserves a total of one year of confinement. The judge could
either sentence the offender to one year of confinement with credit for
time served or to ten months' confinement without credit for time
served. Either approach causes the offender to spend ten additional
months confined. In cases where judges are unclear about whether
they credited time served, appellate courts frequently presume that a
sentencing judge gave credit so long as the total time spent in
presentence custody plus the time to be spent punished is shorter than
the maximum permissible sentence. 35 When failure to credit time
served would lead to an offender spending more total time in
confinement than the statutory maximum, most jurisdictions require
judges to give credit.36 In the small number of states that give judges
33. Corey Kilgannon & Jeffrey E. Singer, Charges Are Dropped Against Mother in Shaken-
Baby Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, at A22.
34. Marlise Simons, Congolese Warlord Draws First Sentence from International Criminal
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at A4.
35. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 489 P.2d 596, 599 (Colo. 1971) ("The law is clear that if the
actual sentence imposed, plus the time spent in jail prior to sentence, does not exceed the
maximum sentence which could be imposed, it will be conclusively presumed that the sentencing
court gave the defendant credit for the pre-sentence time spent in confinement."). In Vasquez v.
Cooper, for example, Paul Vasquez was unable to make bail and spent 284 days in detention
prior to trial and sentencing. 862 F.2d 250, 251 (10th Cir. 1988). The judge stated at sentencing
that "consideration was given" to Vasquez's prior confinement and that "[t]he court does not
credit the defendant with any time previously served." Id. The Tenth Circuit denied Vasquez's
claim that his sentence unconstitutionally failed to credit his time served because the court
stated that it took into account his time in detention. Id. at 254. "Requiring the judge to
determine the sentence necessary to serve the state's penological interests by disregarding the
time previously served by the defendant, and then mechanically subtracting that time from the
sentence given, would be an artificial and meaningless exercise." Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
36. See, e.g., In re Benninghoven, 749 P.2d 1302, 1303 (Wash. 1988) (citing State v. Cook,
679 P.2d 413 (Wash. 1984)) ("In determining maximum and minimum sentences, credit must be
given for pretrial and presentencing detention time."); Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39, 41-42
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discretion to award credit for time served,37 however, there is arguably
no constitutional right to credit. 38
D. The Conflict Between Proportionality and Credit for Time Served
Though detainees are occasionally denied credit for time
served, they usually receive it.39 Indeed, offenders are sometimes
sentenced only to the time that they have already spent in detention.40
Intuitively, however, justice may have been served in such cases, even
though no one was punished at all in the technical sense. Hence, there
appears to be a conflict among the following three commonly held
beliefs: (1) pretrial detention is not punishment, (2) punishment
should be proportional to blameworthiness, and (3) convicted
detainees should receive credit for time served. Taken separately, each
seems quite plausible. Together, however, they seriously conflict and
generate what I call the "mystery of credit for time served."
Proportionalists could resolve the mystery simply by denying
that we should credit time served. Few will choose this option,
however, as credit for time served seems to be quite popular. Indeed, I
know of no scholar who has argued against it.
In the next four Sections, I describe and reject responses that
proportionalists might give. They are intended to resolve the mystery
by arguing either that credit for time served does not lead to
disproportional punishment or that it leads to disproportionality that
can nevertheless be justified. In the fifth Section, I introduce an
(W. Va. 1978) (holding that credit must be given for pretrial detention under West Virginia's
Constitution and stating that "the modern trend is to constitutionally require credit for pre- and
post-conviction jail time absent some extraordinary factors").
37. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 9:28 (2012).
38. See Ibsen v. Warden, 471 P.2d 229, 231 (Nev. 1970) ("No courts considering a request
for credit [for time spent in county jail] have found a defendant entitled to credit as a matter of
right in the absence of a statute either permitting or requiring the giving of such credit."); see
also Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d 1068, 1069 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp.
416, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (failing to credit time served when sentencing to the statutory
maximum violates constitutional rights to equal protection and to avoid double jeopardy);
Comment, Credit for Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1148, 1148-
50 (1973) (arguing that a "prisoner ... sentenced to a maximum term [has] a constitutional right
to receive credit for presentence incarceration").
39. See supra notes 31-32 (citing federal and state statutes mandating the practice).
40. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Shaken, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 6, 2011, at 30, 36 (noting that
British au pair Louise Woodward was sentenced to time served after her controversial conviction
for involuntary manslaughter in the apparent shaking death of the child in her care); Jim
Fitzgerald, NY Bride Who Faked Cancer Released from Jail, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 23, 2012,
available at http:/Ibigstory.ap.org/contentiny-bride-who-faked-cancer-released-jail (describing the
sentence of time served for a woman who faked having cancer in order to garner donations for
her "dream wedding").
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alternative conception of proportionality based on harsh treatment
that superficially resolves the mystery of credit for time served. Later,
in Part II, I explain why even this approach is inadequate.
1. The Recharacterization Response
Proportionalists might claim that acquitted detainees are not
punished but argue that convicted detainees are punished
retroactively upon conviction. By so arguing, they hope to preserve the
policy of giving credit for time served while still punishing in
proportion to blame. But how can punishment be imposed
retroactively?
Proportionalists could argue that our description of an act
sometimes changes based on events that happen after the act is
completed. For example, if an inmate earnestly participates in
vocational training and twelve-step programs while in prison and then
abides by the law after release, we are inclined to say that he
rehabilitated in prison. But if he participates just as earnestly in these
programs, yet upon release behaves in the same violent, chaotic
manner that he did before entering prison, we will say he did not
rehabilitate. So whether he rehabilitated in prison, one might argue,
depends on information we don't know until after he leaves prison.
Just as we cannot decide whether participation in vocational training
constitutes rehabilitation until years later, we cannot decide whether
detention constitutes punishment until an offender's guilt is
determined.
But even though we informally recharacterize acts based on
subsequent events, these recharacterizations are just shorthand
expressions. More accurately, we should say that the inmate
participated in acts intended to rehabilitate and was successful in one
scenario and not the other.
Furthermore, retroactive recharacterization of conduct during
detention would require us to radically alter the traditional meaning
of punishment. For example, we would have to change the
requirement that punishment be "intended to be burdensome or
painful"41 to say something very unnatural like "punishment either is
or subsequently was intended to be burdensome or painful." Under
this new description, it is not clear when, if ever, we can make a
definitive determination about whether a person was punished.
My main argument against recharacterization, however, is that
we are unlikely to defend it in a consistent manner. Recharacterizing
41. DUFF, supra note 15, at xiv-xv.
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conduct is surely convenient, but doing so makes our punishment
characterizations too implausible. For example, when a person is
erroneously convicted and forced to spend a decade in prison, we could
simply recharacterize his treatment after the fact as nonpunishment.
But no one would believe it. Indeed, the suggestion is reminiscent of
widely debunked efforts to deny by fiat the possibility of punishing the
innocent.42 In any event, most people likely think that whether
conduct is punishment depends on the conduct at the time it occurs
and not on subsequent events.
2. The Compensation Response
Proportionalists might argue that credit for time served is a
form of compensation. Detainees are deprived of liberty, so if they are
convicted, we compensate them by punishing them less than they
deserve. This strategy salvages a general commitment to
proportionality while recognizing a limited exception for purposes of
compensation.
If any detainees are entitled to compensation, however, surely
those who are acquitted deserve it. But in the United States we deny
compensation to even these more deserving detainees. Some countries
do compensate defendants who are acquitted or whose charges are
dropped, 43 so proportionalists could acknowledge that all pretrial
detainees deserve compensation and concede that current practice in
the United States is simply a second-rate solution.
There are three major reasons, however, to doubt that the
compensation response alone can justify credit for time served. First,
it is unclear why reduced punishment can compensate for detention.
Proportionalists must explain why detention and punishment are
sufficiently different pretrial that we can deny detainees the rights
associated with being punished yet are sufficiently similar post-trial
that they can be traded off on a day-for-day basis. 44
42. Anthony Quinton, for example, argued that we cannot possibly punish the innocent
because, by definition, punishment must be inflicted on actual offenders. Anthony Quinton, On
Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 133, 136-37 (1954). Such "definitional stops," however, do nothing to
justify the harsh treatment of innocent people. See HART, supra note 11, at 5-6.
43. See Omer Dekel, Should the Acquitted Recover Damages? The Right of an Acquitted
Defendant to Receive Compensation for the Injury He Has Suffered, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, art. 5
(2011) (stating that England, France, Germany, Austria, Norway, and Hong Kong, among others,
have systems for compensating acquitted defendants).
44. There may indeed be an explanation for treating detention and punishment as
commensurable only in certain contexts. For example, we do not allow people to buy bodily
organs, but if you forcibly take someone's organ, you owe the person monetary compensation.
Even in the organ context, however, we are entitled to an explanation as to why organs and
2013] 1151
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Second, if we were to compensate detainees, it would be better
to provide financial compensation. The compensation could be held in
escrow so that the victims of an offender's crime could make a claim
against it first. Surely crime victims are more deserving of
compensation than the people convicted of causing them harm. Thus,
if credit for time served is a form of compensation, it is certainly not
the best method of compensating.
Third, punishment reduction lacks certain features, such as
transferability, that are common to methods of compensation. For
example, if A negligently crashes into B and owes B compensation, B
can transfer his interests in compensation to some third party. But if
the state owes a punishment reduction to an offender who was
detained, the offender cannot transfer it to anyone else. Similarly, we
cannot transfer compensation to our future selves by banking up
punishment reductions for later use. If an offender spends one month
in pretrial detention but is later acquitted, he does not receive a one-
month reduction when committing some future crime. And we
certainly would not give the offender a get-out-of-jail-free card to
commit an offense punishable by less than a month's incarceration.
There are, of course, strong deterrence reasons not to allow
people to bank up credit toward future crimes. So perhaps such cases
present special exceptions. But consider this possibility45 : In early
2010, a person evades his taxes in a manner that goes undetected.
Later that year, he is falsely accused of murder and spends six months
in pretrial detention before the murder charges are dismissed. In
2013, authorities discover his tax evasion from three years prior, and
he is sentenced to six months in prison. If time spent in pretrial
detention warrants compensation in the form of punishment
reduction, then his six months in pretrial detention for a murder he
did not commit should serve to eliminate his sentence for the fraud
that he did commit. In this case, the deterrence rationale does not
work because we may assume that, when he evaded his taxes, he did
not anticipate that he would subsequently be falsely accused of
murder. Yet proportionalists would likely reject credit for time served
in this context even though there is no especially strong deterrence
rationale for rejecting it.
Given that compensation proponents find detention and
punishment commensurable only when it is convenient for their
dollars are only sometimes treated as commensurable. Compensation proponents owe a similar
explanation in punishment contexts.
45. See Shawn J. Bayern, The Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-
Play Analysis of Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 19 (2009) (providing a similar example).
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theory, and given that we cannot save or transfer credits in the way
that we can for other forms of compensation, it seems unlikely that
compensation is a strong enough rationale to justify failing to punish
proportionally. 46
3. The Socioeconomic Disparity Response
Some people accused of crimes are detained because they
cannot afford bail, even though others accused of equally serious
crimes make bail and retain their freedom. If we denied credit for time
served, those unable to make bail would systematically be confined
longer than those who can. Although the ability to make bail is not
perfectly correlated with wealth since courts take people's assets into
account when setting bail, 47 as a general rule, poorer people have more
difficulty making bail than richer people.
So, one might argue, we should give credit for time served to
reduce the disparity in treatment of rich and poor. Even though giving
credit for time served leads to disproportional punishment, the
disproportionality is justified by the principle that duration of
confinement should not be a function of wealth.
Courts have often expressed concern about the disparate
socioeconomic effects of bail. Several have held it unconstitutional to
deny credit for time served in cases where offenders simply couldn't
afford bail, at least when their total time confined implicates the
statutory maximum.48 Crediting time served does not entirely
eliminate socioeconomic disparity because acquitted detainees cannot
take advantage of the policy, but it at least reduces wealth-related
disparate treatment.49
46. In Part II, I argue that prison inflicts a great deal of harm that is technically not
punishment. Those who insist we compensate pretrial harm inflicted by the state that is
technically not punishment should also be prepared to compensate offenders for the post-trial
harm I describe in Part II that is also inflicted by the state and is technically not punishment.
47. Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250, 252 (10th Cir. 1988) ("As a theoretical matter, one
need not be indigent to be unable to post bail. . . . A person could have considerable assets and
yet be unable to post the level of bail that a judge has determined necessary to prevent flight.").
48. See, e.g., Palmer v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 253, 254 (11th Cir. 1987) (requiring credit for time
served for indigent defendant under federal equal protection doctrine); Martin v. Leverette, 244
S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (W. Va. 1978) (same under state constitutional requirement of equal protection
and prohibition of double jeopardy); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 37, § 8:7 (stating that most
courts "have required credit for any pretrial incarceration time resulting from an indigent's
inability to raise bail, at least where the statutory maximum sentence had been imposed" but
recognizing disagreement).
49. Why shouldn't the rich be able to take advantage of their wealth in pretrial detention
as they do in so many other areas? After all, only rich people can buy fancy food, cars, health
care, and homes. One possible explanation is that our egalitarian intuitions are especially strong
in punishment contexts. I suspect, for example, that people would be more willing to permit
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The problem with this response is that some offenders who
commit especially serious crimes are simply ineligible for bail. They
are detained regardless of wealth. If proportionalists only supported
credit for time served for bail-eligible crimes, the socioeconomic
response might succeed. But credit for time served is widely given
even for those ineligible for bail, and I suspect that jibes with most
people's intuitions. If so, the socioeconomic disparity response is just a
sideshow rather than the main attraction; it cannot explain why we
are inclined to give credit for time served as often as we do.
4. The Pleading Pressure Response
Without credit for time served, every day in pretrial detention
is a day without liberty that does nothing to reduce a future sentence.
Detainees in such circumstances would have strong incentives to
resolve their cases quickly. So one reason to credit time served is to
reduce pressure on detainees to make hasty plea bargains or
inadequately prepare for trial. Thus, proportionalists might argue,
even though credit for time served leads to too little punishment, we
give credit so that detainees are not inappropriately pressured to
short-circuit the time-consuming but hopefully error-reducing process
of developing a thorough defense with the assistance of counsel.
It is hardly obvious, however, that we ought to credit time
served in order to reduce pressure on defendants. Doing so deviates
from proportionality with certainty to correct for the mere risk of a
proportionality violation. While this tradeoff might sometimes be
warranted, we should be skeptical absent further evidence.50
people in medical quarantine to purchase better, fancier accommodations than they would to
permit pretrial detainees to do the same. The very fact that we think rich and poor should be
treated in objectively similar conditions in detention suggests that we think about detention in
ways that are similar to punishment.
50. There are several reasons to question whether credit for time served eases
inappropriate pretrial decisionmaking. First, those more likely to be acquitted may have
stronger incentives to commence a trial than those less likely to be acquitted since the acquitted
receive no benefits from credit for time served policies.
Second, it is hardly obvious how much, if any, pressure defendants ought to feel to plea
bargain or speedily prepare a defense. The state pays the cost of every prosecution, as well as the
defense in most felony prosecutions. Under these conditions, defendants who expect to receive
prison time may have too little incentive to plead guilty or to efficiently prepare for trial because
they are not accruing costs while the state is. On the other hand, some defendants and their
families must go into debt in order to make bail. The costs of raising capital will create pressure
to speedily resolve a case. Even the anxiety of being accused of a crime will have variable effects
on how quickly defendants plead or go to trial. In other words, there are many variables at play,
and it is difficult to identify the baseline amount of pressure defendants should experience in
order to encourage them to resolve their cases at the appropriate pace.
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More importantly, even if crediting time served sometimes
eases excessive pressure on defendants, such pressure does not
explain the general policy of crediting time served. Simply imagine a
defendant who is smart, well advised by counsel, and faces a sentence
that is sufficiently long that his time spent in pretrial detention is
unlikely to affect his deliberations. In such a case, we are still inclined
to credit his time served. In fact, our intuitions about whether he
ought to receive credit are unaffected by the deliberative pressures he
faces. Hence, the pleading pressure excuse cannot tell the whole story
of why we credit time served. Indeed, we credit time served because
most people think doing so promotes proportionality.
5. The Proportional Harsh Treatment Response
Until now, I have taken quite literally the retributivist view
that offenders deserve punishment. What they may really mean,
however, is that offenders deserve to suffer,51 even when that suffering
is not specifically intended as punishment for an offense. Hence, a
more plausible response to the mystery of credit for time served than
those I have considered so far is to give up on proportionality between
blameworthiness and punishment and replace it with proportionality
between blameworthiness and harsh treatment (where harsh
treatment refers to the causing of suffering or deprivation even when
not intended as punishment). 52 Though detention is not punishment,
it is still harsh treatment and should therefore make an offender less
deserving of additional harsh treatment.53
Third, prosecutors already exert enormous pressure on defendants to plead by offering them
deals with substantially less severe punishments than they face at trial. Such pressure may
swamp the effects of credit for time served policies. Moreover, even if crediting time served does
create inordinate pressure to plea bargain, we might correct the problem by altering
prosecutorial discretion or increasing judicial oversight rather than by making punishments
disproportionally short.
51. See Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CRIMINAL LAW 433, 437-38 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).
52. In the text, I say that we should speak of "proportional harsh treatment" instead of
"proportional punishment" to highlight the distinction. Alternatively, we could uniformly speak
of "proportional punishment" but recognize that "punishment" in this context includes certain
unintentional harsh treatment as well. In the past, I have sometimes taken this second
approach. See, e.g., Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 4, at 1602-03 ("Retributivists who
claim that they can ignore the full, comparative range of harms to inmates simply because those
harms are unintended have failed to fully justify those punishments.").
53. Jack Chin has argued that deportation, detention, and civil fines constitute "quasi-
punishment" that should be considered at sentencing. Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime,
Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1417, 1454-56 (2011). And at least with respect to harsh treatment deemed to be a "collateral
sanction," the ABA Criminal Justice Standards state that sentencing "court[s] should consider
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Precisely what constitutes the kind of harsh treatment that
should count for proportionality purposes is debatable. After all,
offenders may have experienced a wide variety of harsh treatment
throughout their lives. Sometimes the harsh treatment precedes their
crimes by many years, as where offenders suffered severe abuse or
deprivation as children. Sometimes suffering results directly from
offenders' crimes. A robber might break a leg or be paralyzed during a
dangerous robbery. Similarly, parents who negligently leave an infant
to die in the backseat of a hot automobile suffer severely from their
own criminal negligence. 54 Reasonable people may disagree about
whether the suffering that counts in proportionality analysis must be
inflicted before or only after the pertinent crime and about whether it
must be inflicted by the state, as opposed to other people or natural
causes.56 Even if we restrict the relevant harsh treatment to state
acts, fair questions arise about which sorts of acts count. If an inmate
is injured in a prison fire through no fault of prison officials, we may
not consider such purely accidental harm part of the inmate's harsh
treatment.
Tricky details about what constitutes harsh treatment aside,
pretrial detention is surely an easy case. The state knowingly imposes
the harsh treatment of detention as part of our penal machinery. If
any kind of harsh treatment should count, surely pretrial detention
should. Hence, as offenders receive harsh treatment in detention, the
amount of punishment they continue to deserve declines accordingly.
Thus, we give credit for the harsh treatment of detention.
When proportionality focuses on harsh treatment rather than
punishment, we can better square the Supreme Court's view that
pretrial detention is not punishment with the policy of giving credit
for time served. Since pretrial detention is not punishment, the Court
can argue that detainees are denied the set of constitutional rights
associated with punishment. Nevertheless, we grant detainees credit
for time served to promote proportional harsh treatment.
applicable collateral sanctions in determining an offender's overall sentence," STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF
CONVICTED PERSONS 19-2.4(a) (3d ed. 2004), and "should ensure that the totality of the penalty
is not unduly severe," id. at 19-2.4(a) cmt.
54. See Gene Weingarten, Fatal Distraction, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2009, at W8; Mitchell
Berman, Hasn't Kesen Hu Suffered Enough?, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN (Feb. 20, 2010),
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/opinion/berman-hasnt-kesen-hu-suffered-enough-1/nRqhb.
55. For example, according to Gertrude Ezorsky's whole-life view of desert, a proper
"[a]ssessment of a criminal's desert after an offense would require that one balance all of his
moral wrongs against the suffering of his entire life." Gertrude Ezorsky, The Ethics of
Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, at xi, xxvi (Gertrude Ezorsky
ed., 1972).
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We can also understand certain debates about credit for time
served as reasonable efforts to untangle the nature of the harsh
treatment that should count for purposes of proportionality. For
example, many state statutes and court decisions require that
offenders receive credit for time involuntarily confined at mental
institutions while awaiting trial.56 Like pretrial detention, involuntary
commitment is what I call a "punishment look-alike." The harsh
treatment of state-imposed institutionalization is often deemed
sufficiently comparable to the harsh treatment of incarceration to
warrant giving credit.
It is less clear whether time spent involuntarily restricted to a
community treatment center should count for purposes of giving
credit, and jurisdictions split on the issue.5 7 Confinement at a
community treatment center generally entails less restrictive
conditions than pretrial detention or incarceration, making it a
"punishment less-alike." Since it falls considerably short of the
severity of punishment, we are disinclined to grant full credit for time
served. Forced to choose between counting such time completely or not
at all, courts vary. Conditions in pretrial home confinement might be
deemed less restrictive than in community treatment centers, and
courts have been particularly unlikely to treat home confinement,
another punishment less-alike, as warranting credit for time served.58
When proportionality focuses on harsh treatment, we can
identify more sensible policies toward punishment less-alikes.
Namely, we can give partial credit.59 While it is difficult to assess
precisely how much credit those sentenced to community treatment
56. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-11 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-196.1 (2012); People v.
Cowsar, 115 Cal. Rptr. 160, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (requiring credit for time confined to a
mental health facility); Prejean v. State, 794 P.2d 877, 878 (Wyo. 1990) (same); CAMPBELL, supra
note 37, § 9:28 ("Many states explicitly require credit for time spent in government mental
institutions in connection with the current offense."); cf. Closs v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles,
656 N.W.2d 314, 315, 318 (S.D. 2003) (denying credit for postconviction involuntary confinement
in a mental health facility deemed unrelated to the inmate's criminal sentence).
57. CAMPBELL, supra note 37, § 9:28; see also Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64-65 (1995)
(resolving a split among federal circuit courts by holding that time spent in pretrial detention at
a community treatment center did not constitute the kind of detention required to receive credit
under the federal credit for time served statute).
58. See, e.g., Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining
to grant credit for time spent in pretrial home confinement); State v. Hughes, 476 S.E.2d 189,
199 (W. Va. 1996) (same); CAMPBELL, supra note 37, § 9:28 ("[M]ost states refuse to credit time
spent under house arrest."). But cf. 730 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-100 (West 2012) (stating
that, with some exceptions, "the trial court shall give credit to the defendant for time spent in
home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration").
59. See generally Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1992034 (describing the relative
benefits of "smooth" laws that provide for outputs more closely tied to their inputs).
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centers, house arrest, or work furloughs deserve, any amount greater
than zero would more accurately reflect the amount of harsh
treatment they receive than do prevailing policies that give no credit
at all. So even if courts would have difficulty determining the precise
amount of credit to give for time spent in punishment less-alikes,
surely the legislature could pass statutes that would better reflect the
amount of harsh treatment we impose.
Overall, focusing on proportional harsh treatment rather than
proportional punishment may offer the best retributivist solution to
the mystery of credit for time served that still retains some notion of
proportionality. It explains why constitutional rights in detention may
differ from those in prison and may point us to practical methods to
treat more uniformly the various kinds of liberty restrictions we
impose.
II. AGAINST PROPORTIONAL HARSH TREATMENT
Shifting from proportional punishment to proportional harsh
treatment, however, only solves the mystery of credit for time served
by generating even deeper problems that strike at the very heart of
retributivist proportionality in its familiar forms. Namely, we inflict
lots of harsh treatment that we ignore at sentencing. If harsh
treatment must be proportional to blame, then we can no longer
ignore it. Even if we restrict harsh treatment to inflictions knowingly
imposed by the state, we would have to radically revise our sentencing
policies to properly measure and dispense harsh treatment. Most
importantly, actually implementing the necessary changes would lead
to very counterintuitive-some would say absurd-results.
A. The Different Facilities Challenge
Suppose inmates Cushy and Rough are equally blameworthy
and are sentenced to four-year prison terms. Assume they are alike in
all pertinent respects except that Cushy is sent to a relatively
comfortable prison with spacious one-person cells, lots of natural light
and time outdoors, good access to television and other media, and
plenty of opportunities to see his family. Rough, by contrast, is sent to
an austere prison with small multiple-occupancy cells, little natural
light or time outdoors, poor access to television and other media, and
few opportunities to see his family.
Even though their prison sentences are the same length and
they are equally blameworthy, Rough receives harsher treatment than
Cushy. Under a principle of proportional harsh treatment, Cushy and
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Rough are not both treated proportionally, even though their
blameworthiness calls for equally severe treatment.
The mere fact that the duration of their sentences is the same
is not enough. Even though most systems of sentencing have what I
call a duration fetish 60-a nearly exclusive focus on the period of time
during which a person is confined-sentence severity also depends on
other prison hardships, like the small size of cells or limited
availability of natural light. Duration cannot be the sole determinant
of severity. For one thing, some punishments, like fines, are
transactional and have no meaningful duration. Moreover, sentences
of a year's confinement at home, in prison, and in solitary confinement
clearly differ in their severity, even if they all have one year's
duration. If we recognize those variations in conditions, we must
recognize the same, albeit more modest, variations in conditions
across different kinds of ordinary incarceration.
There has to be some way of aggregating the severity of
different aspects of incarceration, otherwise it would be extremely
difficult to assess sentence severity and have confidence that offenders
receive proportional harsh treatment. We can put our heads in the
sand and try to ignore differences among facilities, but that will not
make sentences more proportional. Even if a jurisdiction has only one
prison, conditions of confinement will vary based on inmates'
particular cell assignments, cellmates, guards who interact with them,
and so on.
Proportional harsh treatment requires a fairly detailed
examination not only of the duration of offenders' prison sentences but
also of the conditions they will likely face while incarcerated. 61
Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, the assignment of particular
offenders to particular facilities is primarily the task of prison
bureaucrats, not judges.62 Corrections officials assign inmates to
facilities based on a number of factors, like offender dangerousness
and space availability. So if we were really committed to treating
offenders proportionally, we would have to better combine the tasks of
sentencing and punishment administration.
Whenever judges ignore conditions of confinement at
sentencing (as they often do), they take a big risk that the specific
individual being sentenced will end up confined more harshly than is
60. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 4, at 1606.
61. Because incarceration extends over time, I believe that the state must also consider the
ongoing impact of prison sentences, though my argument will not depend on this stronger claim.
62. Judges may recommend particular facilities, but prison administrators are not
obligated to follow those recommendations. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006) ("The Bureau of
Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment.").
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warranted. And when bureaucrats assign offenders knowing that
sentencing judges likely had less severe conditions in mind, they
knowingly inflict harms on offenders disproportional to what judges
thought they deserved. Such disproportionality is verboten to most
retributivists. According to Hegel, "[A]n injustice is done if there is
even one lash too many, or one dollar or one groschen, one week or one
day in prison too many or too few."63 Similarly, Richard Burgh writes,
"[I]f [an] offender can be said to deserve only so much punishment,
then any punishment in excess of this should be considered as
objectionable as imposing an equivalent amount on an innocent
person."64 Even though Burgh speaks of punishment, once we realize
that talk of punishment severity is really talk of harsh treatment, his
comment seems to prohibit all inflictions in excess of desert that are
knowingly or recklessly imposed by the state.
1. Counterintuitive Implications
So far, proportionalists could accept the different facilities
challenge and recognize that we need to make substantial changes to
our sentencing policies. But there is a more counterintuitive
implication lurking in the background. Prison bureaucrats generally
assign more dangerous inmates to higher-security prisons with more
austere conditions. In fact, it is quite possible that Rough was
assigned to a more austere prison than Cushy because Rough was
deemed more dangerous than Cushy (even though they are equally
blameworthy for their criminal conduct). So when comparing equally
blameworthy offenders, proportionalists have to give more dangerous
offenders shorter sentences than less dangerous offenders in order to
inflict proportional harsh treatment on both of them. This seems like
an unappealing conclusion for proportionalists but one that is hard to
escape in any prison system that makes facility assignments based
even in part on dangerousness.
B. The Subjective Experience Challenge
One might think we could avoid the different facilities
challenge by allowing sentencing judges to make facility assignments
or by having just one kind of facility for all prisoners. Neither solution,
however, would adequately reflect the fact that even in identical
prison conditions, prisoners vary substantially in their experiences of
63. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 245 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821).
64. Richard W. Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHIL. 193, 197 (1982).
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confinement, often predictably so. Some but not all offenders become
depressed, anxious, or claustrophobic. Even when their suffering does
not rise to the level of a clinical diagnosis, it can nevertheless be very
intense.
Suppose Sensitive and Insensitive commit crimes for which
they are equally blameworthy and receive sentences of equal duration
in identical prison conditions.65 In fact, they are alike in all pertinent
respects except that Sensitive is predictably much more distressed by
incarceration than Insensitive. Unless we take differences in
subjective experience into account, especially when we are aware of
them in advance, we do not treat them proportionally.
Moreover, if we lack a good reason for causing Sensitive
additional distress, then we have no justification for inflicting it. The
central reason we have theories of punishment is to justify the harms
we cause offenders. Just as you and I cannot inflict serious harms-
like the harms of incarceration-on others without a justification, the
state must have a justification when it seriously harms offenders.66
A retributivist might say that we are justified in harshly
treating offenders to the extent that they deserve it. But if Insensitive
receives the maximum permissible harm given his blameworthiness,
then the equally blameworthy Sensitive receives excessive harm that
is knowingly inflicted by the state but cannot be justified in terms of
proportional harsh treatment. Thus, if we do not measure the harms
we inflict, including the experiential harms, we risk not only treating
offenders disproportionally but also giving them harsh treatment in
excess of what is justified.67
65. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 183.
66. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 4, at 14-16 (defending the 'justification
symmetry principle").
67. In prior work, I argued in much more detail that any justification of our punishment
practices must take subjective experience into account. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra
note 4. Several writers responded by claiming that we need not ordinarily consider inmates'
subjective experiences. See David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1652-
53 (2010); Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity
to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 909 (2010); Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivists Need
Not and Should Not Endorse the Subjectivist Account of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 1 (2009). Yet none of them addressed my central claim by explaining how we can justify
our punishment practices if we ignore experiential harms. Perhaps they deny that punishment
theorists need to justify such harms at all if they are technically not punishment. See Kolber,
Unintentional Punishment, supra note 4, at 24. This response fails, however, because theorists
who cannot justify the experiential harms we knowingly inflict cannot justify sentences of
incarceration or any other real-world punishments that inevitably include such harms.
Punishment theorists (aside from abolitionists) ought to be able to do so. See id. at 23-29; see
also Michael Tonry, Can Twenty-First Century Punishment Policies Be Justified in Principle?, in
RETRIBUTIVIsM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FUTURE? 3, 20-21 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (characterizing
the view of Markel and Flanders as a "definitional stop").
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Nevertheless, we ignore much of the harm we cause prisoners
by failing to examine the experiences particular inmates actually have
or are expected to have. We do so even though offenders would often
be eager to present evidence of their prison-related sensitivities. When
an inmate proffers reliable evidence of his sensitivity that courts
ignore, courts knowingly cause him additional distress that they
would not cause a similarly situated offender who lacks the
sensitivity. Courts therefore treat him harshly in excess of what is
proportional.
Some have understood sentence severity in terms of
deprivations of liberty rather than experiential distress.68 Doing so,
one might argue, is still sufficient to solve the mystery of credit for
time served. One day of pretrial detention deprives a person of about
the same amount of liberty as one day in prison, so we give credit to
preserve proportional harsh treatment.
But even if we count deprivations of liberty as part of the
severity of a sentence, we cannot ignore how prisoners experience
their sentences.69 As I noted earlier, the harms we cause offenders
require justification. If retributivists ignore experiential harms and
fail to count them against an offender's desert debt, then they have
given no justification for inflicting those harms. And since all plausible
methods of punishment cause experiential harms, proportionalists
have no justification for actually punishing anyone.
In addition to the justification problem, sole focus on objective
measurements of liberty deprivation risks making punishment
morally arbitrary. Consider units of length. An eight-foot-tall man in a
tiny prison cell is likely to experience his confinement as much
harsher than a four-foot-tall man would.70 Yet nothing about being tall
68. See, e.g., Robert P.. George, Moralistic Liberalism and Legal Moralism, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1415, 1426 (1990) ("[A] criminal may justly be deprived of liberty commensurate with the
liberty he wrongfully seized in breaking the law."); Kenneth W. Simons, On Equality, Bias
Crimes, and Just Deserts, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 237, 243 (2000) ("When the state
imposes criminal sanctions, it deprives the offender of property or liberty, and it accompanies
that deprivation with a solemn moral condemnation."); cf. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64
PHIL. REV. 3, 10 (1955) (stating that under the proper conditions, "a person is said to suffer
punishment whenever he is legally deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen").
69. Notice that I need not argue that all harms are experiential, only that at least some
are. See Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 4, at 1595 (describing the "limited subjectivist"
position); Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 215-16. In addition, some harms, like
those of capital punishment, can be at least partly explained as deprivations of positive
experiences.
70. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 206-07 (presenting this example);
see also Christopher Beam, Hard Time, SLATE (Feb. 3, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news and politics/crime/2011/02/hardtime.html (discussing a six-foot-nine-inch tall,
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makes the man warrant greater suffering. Deserved harsh treatment
should not depend on arbitrary facts about offenders, like their height.
We can reduce our bias in favor of objective measurements by
imagining a fictitious punishment that I call "boxing."7' People who
are boxed are confined to a cell that is n by n by n, where n is the
height of the offender. Many have the intuition that if the eight-foot-
tall and four-foot-tall offenders are boxed for the same period of time,
they are given essentially the same treatment. And on a view that
takes their experiences of boxing into account, it is quite possible that
they are treated roughly equally. But under the view that only
objectively measured liberty deprivations matter, boxing the shorter
man causes a much greater deprivation of liberty for he is allocated
only one-eighth of the space as the larger man. 72
We cannot have it both ways. If all boxed offenders receive
essentially the same harsh treatment, then our current offender-
insensitive forms of confinement inflict quite variable amounts of
harsh treatment. The bottom line is that when we focus solely on
objectively measured liberty deprivations, we miss out on an
important dimension of harm.
Similar concerns arise in measurements not only of length but
of time. How do theorists who believe that prison is a deprivation of
liberty measure time? Surely the legal treatment of time is irrelevant
to our considered judgments about sentence severity. In order to
better align its clocks with eastern trading partners, the island nation
of Samoa skipped the day of December 30, 2011.73 Regardless of how
the time change is treated under Samoan law, when assessing
severity, the duration of the sentence of an offender imprisoned there
at noon on December 29, 2011, and released at noon on December 31,
2011, was one day not two.
But we must be cautious even when measuring time as an
objective physical process. Special relativity teaches us that even if we
wanted to resort to objective measurements of time, there is no
observer-independent rate at which time passes. To illustrate, assume
that in the distant future we launch spaceships that travel at speeds
five hundred-pound Dutch prisoner who challenged his conditions of confinement under the
European Convention on Human Rights given his small cell and large body).
71. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 235. While boxing is surely a horrendous
form of punishment, similar methods of punishment can easily be imagined where each side is
2n or some other multiple.
72. The larger man is boxed in a space that is 8x8x8 = 512 cubic feet, while the smaller
man is boxed in a space that is 4x4x4 = 64 cubic feet. Perhaps the comparison should be in
square feet instead of volume, but I do not see how a liberty-deprivation theorist can
meaningfully decide without reference to subjective experience.
73. Seth Mydans, Samoa Sacrifices a Day for Its Future, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A4.
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approaching the speed of light and then eventually return to Earth.
Due to the effects of special relativity, a person on such a ship will, on
average, age slowly from the perspective of people on Earth. For
example, a space traveler might age four years on his trip but come
back to a planet whose inhabitants are eight years older.
Now, suppose that twin brothers, alike in virtually all respects,
commit crimes of equal blameworthiness. The only pertinent
difference in their circumstances is that one is incarcerated on Earth
while the other is incarcerated on a roundtrip journey through space
traveling near the speed of light. Assuming the twins deserve equal
harsh treatment, is it more accurate to measure the duration of their
sentences based on an Earth clock or a spaceship clock? Neither. At
least as a rough proxy, the duration of each twin's confinement
depends on the clock in the twin's frame of reference.74
But if we ought to individualize time measurements based on
frames of reference, why stop there? Just as one person's clock might
appear to tick slower than another's because of special relativity, one
person might experience time moving slower than another because of
his unique brain chemistry. When assessing the severity of harms
associated with confinement, there is no obvious moral reason to
consider the ticking of their clocks but not the ticking of their brains,
so to speak. 6
Importantly, we are not harmed by the mere passage of time.
But the harm of experiences like distress, anxiety, and boredom are
related to their perceived duration. And these experiences affect how
harshly offenders are treated by confinement. The difficulty in
accurately measuring them makes them no less harmful.
Alon Harel and Richard Frase have argued that retributivists
who focus on the expressive nature of punishment need not worry
about how punishment is experienced: they can simply understand
punishment in purely objective terms. 6 On the contrary, however,
74. Similar arguments from special relativity could be made about the magnitude of liberty
deprivations in spatial dimensions, since measurements of length also depend on frames of
reference. See, e.g., Yuri Balashov, Persistence and Space-Time Philosophical Lessons of the Pole
and Barn, 83 MONIST 321, 322-29 (2000) (describing spatial contraction and expansion under
special relativity).
75. On our varied experiences of the passing of time itself, see, for example, Melanie Rudd,
Kathleen D. Vohs & Jennifer Aaker, Awe Expands People's Perception of Time, Alters Decision
Making, and Enhances Well-Being, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1130 (2012), and Kathleen D. Vohs &
Brandon J. Schmeichel, Self-Regulation and the Extended Now: Controlling the Self Alters the
Subjective Experience of Time, 85 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 217 (2003).
76. RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE
SYSTEM 110 n.5 (2013); Alon Harel, Economic Analysis of Law: A Survey, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 46 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012).
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how much we harm an offender does not depend on public perceptions.
Assessments of sentence severity sometimes require difficult value
judgments, but no one is entitled to be wrong about the facts. If all
nonincarcerated Samoans forget that the country skipped a day on the
calendar, it will not ease the actual severity of the sentences of
inmates confined on the day that was skipped. More dramatically, if
the public believes that people of a certain race do not feel pain, the
public's mistaken view carries no weight when assessing whether our
policies that cause pain to people of that race are justified. Similarly,
merely believing that a day in prison inflicts the same harm on all
inmates does not make it so. The fact that harm varies from prisoner
to prisoner never goes to the public for a vote."7
There certainly are consequentialist reasons for considering
how the public perceives criminal sanctions. If the public views
sentences in objective terms, we ought to consider such information
when seeking to optimally deter crime. But whether you are a
consequentialist or a retributivist, you must have a sense of the true
amount of harm a sentencing practice causes in order to plausibly
claim that it is justified. So perceptions of sentence severity can play a
limited or indirect role in justifying punishment, but they cannot
supplant a genuine analysis of sentence severity.
It is, of course, quite difficult and costly to take the actual or
anticipated experiences of offenders into account at sentencing or
afterward. Still, we already seek to assess a defendant's mens rea at
trial, and such efforts are also difficult and costly. Moreover, many
jurisdictions have parole boards that seek to measure dangerousness,
and it is hardly clear that it is easier to measure dangerousness than
to assess prisoner experiences. Even now, sentencing policies seem to
embed assumptions about the experiences of prisoners. For example,
the federal sentencing guidelines state that "[m]ental and emotional
conditions may be relevant in determining whether a departure is
warranted, if such conditions, individually or in combination with
other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and
distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the
guidelines."78
In civil suits, we purport to measure negative experiences like
pain, distress, and anxiety all the time.79 Indeed, false imprisonment
77. For more detailed discussion, see Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 208-
10.
78. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (2012).
79. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 219-20.
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cases require juries to estimate harms associated with confinement.80
To the extent that we can cost-effectively make rough measurements
of punishment severity that are experientially sensitive, we are
morally obligated to do so: it cannot be the case that the experience of
punishment only becomes morally relevant when we have technologies
that measure experiences perfectly.81
More importantly, however, practical concerns about cost and
administrative difficulty obscure our current focus. We are trying to
unravel the concept of punishment severity so we can better
understand what it means to dispense proportional harsh treatment.
Even if there are practical difficulties in actually dispensing
proportional harsh treatment, we can assume that we are able to do so
in order to evaluate whether proportional harsh treatment serves as a
desirable ideal.
1. Counterintuitive Implications
In a world where we could accurately measure the subjective
experiences of inmates, we would likely see that rich and famous
people, accustomed as they are to luxurious living, experience the
cramped conditions of prison more severely than average prisoners.
Hence, if we want to give them proportional harsh treatment, they
should spend less time in prison than average prisoners (or the same
amount of time but in more comfortable conditions).
As Doug Husak has noted, however, "Few suggestions are more
distasteful to the public than that the privileged, in virtue of their
elevated status, should be punished less severely than the
disadvantaged."82 Of course, proportionalists need not argue that the
rich should be punished less severely overall but just that they should
be punished less severely in objective terms in order to effect equal
treatment all things considered. Even framed in that way, however,
few people would defend proportional harsh treatment once they
realized that wealthy people would likely spend less time incarcerated
(or the same amount of time but in more comfortable conditions) than
their equally blameworthy but poorer cellmates. I suspect that most
people would rather see rich and famous prisoners suffer more than
80. Id. at 220.
81. Cf. Kolber, Experiential Future, supra note 4, at 587-622 (arguing that emerging
neuroscience technologies may eventually enable more objective assessments of subjective
experiences); Tobias Stalder et al., Cortisol in Hair and the Metabolic Syndrome, J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM (forthcoming) (using strands of hair to measure stress hormone
levels over extended periods of time).
82. Husak, supra note 23, at 82.
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their equally blameworthy but less sensitive fellow inmates, so long as
the duration of their sentences were roughly comparable. In other
words, many people find truly proportional harsh treatment
undesirable when applied across the socioeconomic spectrum. 83
C. The Baseline Challenge
The biggest problem with proportionality, however, does not
depend on whether punishment is measured in units of bad
experiences or liberty deprivations or some combination of both. The
most devastating problem is that we measure incarceration using an
idiosyncratic, morally irrelevant method that is inconsistent with the
way we understand harm in other contexts.
To sensibly measure the harm associated with a sentence, we
need to do so the same way we measure other kinds of harm: as a
worsening from a baseline condition. 84 We compare the condition of
something after an injury to either its condition before the injury (a
historical baseline)85 or, on some views, the condition it would have
been in had it not been injured (a counterfactual baseline).86 If I crash
into your car, for example, we measure the harm I caused by
comparing the car's condition after the accident to its baseline
condition.87 The key point is that harm is a worsening from one
reference point to another.
Suppose an inmate is incarcerated for one year, under
conditions that give him ten units of quality of life each day of the
year. How much have we harmed him by incarceration? It is
impossible to say. To determine how much he has worsened in prison,
we need to know his baseline condition. If he would have had one
hundred units of quality of life each day in his baseline condition, then
83. In Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 230-35, I consider various attempts
to make our intuitions about wealthy offenders consistent with proportional-punishment
intuitions but conclude that, ultimately, they probably cannot be made to cohere.
84. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-64 (1984); see also Stephen Perry, Harm,
History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1283, 1309-13 (2003). Seana Shiffrin
challenges the "comparative model" of harm in Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life,
Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 120-22 (1999),
and I respond in Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 4, at 1579-81.
85. See Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in
FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT 3, 7 (1992).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., [1880] 5 A.C. 25 [39] (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Scot.) (stating that juries should award "that sum of money which will put the party who
has been injured ... in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the
wrong"); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1315, 1321 n.19 (2003); Perry, supra note 84, at 1310 n.49.
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his harsh treatment consists of a ninety-unit-per-day deprivation in
quality of life.
When it comes to our actual sentencing practices, however, we
don't measure the severity of sentences using the comparative method
just described. As I have argued elsewhere in more detail,88 we
measure the severity of prison sentences in absolute terms by looking
only at the condition of inmates while incarcerated. We tend to think
two sentences are equal if they have the same duration and
conditions. Yet we are actually depriving people of quality of life to
very different degrees because, before being sent to prison, offenders
vary widely in their baseline amounts of property, freedom of motion,
life satisfaction, social connectivity, and so forth. A person with a lot of
baseline autonomy is more restricted by some set of prison conditions
than a person with less baseline autonomy. Whether we measure in
generic units of quality of life or in utiles (units of good experiences) or
in libertiles (units of liberty)89 makes no difference. Sentencing still
constitutes a worsening.
Since we must understand sentence severity comparatively,
our noncomparative intuitions about incarceration are confused. We
arbitrarily focus on punishment's "end-state condition," meaning the
condition of an offender as a result of his punishment. 90 End-state
conditions tell consequentialists something important about
preventing crime: if a person is locked up, he poses less danger to
people outside prison walls. But end-state conditions tell us nothing
about the burden prison imposes on inmates unless we can make good
assumptions about their baselines.
We actually use the proper comparative method of measuring
harms when we fine offenders. By their very nature, fines specify the
amount by which to worsen a person's condition. Fines implicitly say:
"Take how much money you had in your baseline condition and reduce
it by the amount of the fine." Whether we should understand fine
severity in objective terms, like dollars, or in more subjective terms,
like disutility, we still treat fines as reductions (from a baseline level
of assets or a baseline level of utility).91
88. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 4.
89. See id. at 1567 (describing 'ibertiles").
90. Id. at 1592, 1605-07.
91. Some countries do take income level into account when setting fine amounts, perhaps
as a rough proxy for experiential harm. See Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 4, at 1575-
77; Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 226; see also Alan Cowell, Not in Finland
Anymore? More Like Nokialand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at A3 (describing a Finnish executive
who was fined approximately one hundred thousand dollars, based on his income, for traveling
at forty-six-miles per hour in a thirty-miles-per-hour zone).
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We also make a crude effort to use the proper comparative
method when assessing the punishment of people already in prison.
When a prisoner escapes and is later tried and convicted for the
independent crime of prison escape, his new sentence will begin after
his current sentence rather than run concurrent with it.92 If the new
sentence were to run concurrently, he would receive essentially no
harsh treatment at all for escaping because his punished condition
would be the same as his baseline (already imprisoned) condition.
Thus, we do take baseline conditions into account when it would
clearly be silly to do otherwise. But we cannot have it both ways. If the
comparative method of measuring fine severity is correct and the
comparative method of punishing prisoners for escape is correct, then
the end-state method we use to measure the severity of incarceration
in run-of-the-mill cases is deeply flawed.
1. Counterintuitive Implications
To measure the severity of incarceration in run-of-the-mill
cases using the comparative approach, we would have to first assess
the quality of a person's life in his baseline condition and then ratchet
it down in prison to inflict the appropriate worsening of his condition.
Doing so is a drastic departure from our current sentencing policies
that focus almost exclusively on offenders' end-state conditions (like
how long they spend incarcerated). If proportionalists do adopt the
comparative approach, however, they will quickly run into its very
counterintuitive implications for proportionality.
Suppose, for example, that Freeman and Quarantine both steal
money from a bank by hacking into its computer system and are
equally blameworthy for doing so. They are alike in all relevant
respects except that Freeman commits his crime on his home
computer while Quarantine uses a computer in the facility where he is
under long-term quarantine for a contagious, currently incurable
disease that he contracted due to no fault of his own.
Let's assume that proportional treatment for Freeman requires
us to incarcerate him for one year. How do we give Quarantine equal
harsh treatment? Since Quarantine begins with less liberty (and lower
quality of life) than Freeman, in order to give Quarantine the same
amount of harsh treatment we would have to make his sentence much
longer or else make his confinement conditions much more restricted.
Because Freeman has much more liberty (and higher quality of life) to
92. See, e.g., People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 335-36 (1977) (considering the appeal of an
inmate given a consecutive sentence for escape).
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begin with, proportional harsh treatment means that Quarantine
must be subjected to extreme conditions of deprivation. Perhaps he
must be placed in solitary confinement to effect the same deprivation
as was imposed on Freeman.
While Freeman and Quarantine represent an extreme case, the
rest of us differ in our baseline quality of life as well. For example,
richer people have more possessions than poorer people, so prison
deprives them of more. Nevertheless, most people are happy to ignore
the greater deprivations of incarcerated rich people relative to
incarcerated poor people. This is so even if we knew people's wealth
with certainty. Yet if retributivists ignore the changes in conditions
imposed by incarceration, then they fail to recognize the full impact of
the sentences they impose and do not really inflict proportional harsh
treatment.
Indeed, we seem to treat end-state conditions as if they matter
to the complete exclusion of baseline conditions. For even when we
specify that two inmates had very different levels of wealth outside of
prison, people likely maintain the intuition that such inmates are
punished equally by equal terms in identical prison conditions, even
though one is deprived of far more property rights in prison than the
other. Given that punishment severity can only be understood as a
change from a baseline, our current intuitions about punishment are
actually leading to disproportional outcomes. Since our intuitions are
mostly unfazed by baseline conditions, it means that we are not really
committed to proportional harsh treatment. 93
93. Another possibility is that offenders do not deserve worsenings in their conditions but
rather to be put in circumstances that reflect what they deserve. See Ezorsky, supra note 55
(describing the whole-life view of desert in which a proper "[a]ssessment of a criminal's desert
after an offense would require that one balance all of his moral wrongs against the suffering of
his entire life"). The whole-life view may be immune to the baseline challenge because it
deliberately focuses on making end-state conditions fit with a person's lifetime desert. Moreover,
the whole-life view may resolve the mystery of credit for time served: relative to an otherwise
identical offender who has not been detained, a detained offender has faced additional suffering
in detention that warrants being released sooner.
The whole-life view of desert has several serious problems, however, aside from the enormous
practical difficulties of implementing it. First, a person who engaged in many acts of great moral
virtue would seem to be entitled to commit some minor crimes without any punishment at all.
Second, criminal fines are inconsistent with such a system since they represent amounts by
which to deprive an offender relative to a baseline. Fines under a whole-life view of desert would
have to stipulate asset levels rather than just deviations from current assets, as fines do today.
Finally, if we ought to radically revise the criminal justice system to ensure that offenders get
what they deserve, there is no obvious reason to only give people what they deserve when they
commit crimes and not to correct more generally whenever they receive more or less than they
deserve. Such a world is probably inconsistent with anything like a free-market economy since
the spoils of free markets will deviate substantially from moral desert.
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D. Collateral Consequences
I have described some of the many ways that harsh treatment
varies among inmates. Such harsh treatment continues to vary long
after inmates are released. 94 For example, released inmates are often
limited in their rights to vote, carry weapons, receive public benefits,
hold particular jobs, and so on.95 Some are greatly distressed by a loss
of voting rights, while some are indifferent. Some are greatly
worsened by reduced job opportunities relative to their baselines (for
example, physicians who lose their licenses to practice medicine) while
some are worsened to lesser degrees (for example, the perennially
unemployed).
Of course, the post-release harms offenders suffer are not
typically considered punishment.96 But that's irrelevant. Time served
in detention is not considered punishment either. Yet if we are willing
to count the harsh treatment of pretrial detention that precedes
conviction, surely we must count the harsh treatment that comes
after. Merely stipulating that an offender's sentence ends when he is
released from prison does not mean he is no longer harshly treated by
the state's prior deliberate actions.
Some may find it counterintuitive to treat collateral
consequences as a form of harsh treatment. Others may find it a
much-needed corrective. Currently, collateral consequences are either
ignored at sentencing or considered haphazardly. Consistently
treating collateral consequences as harsh treatment would represent a
dramatic departure from current practices.
III. THE CONSEQUENTIALIST SOLUTION
In this Part, I explain how the criticism of proportionality in
Part II also applies to more limited notions of proportionality. I then
argue that the failure of retributivists to offer an appealing notion of
94. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 4, at 21; cf. John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1463, 1482-96 (2010).
95. See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 9 (2003) ("Since 1980, the United States has passed dozens of laws restricting the kinds
of jobs for which ex-prisoners can be hired, easing the requirements for their parental rights to
be terminated, restricting their access to public welfare and housing subsidies, and limiting their
right to vote.").
96. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators," 93 MINN. L. REV.
670, 672 (2008) ("Direct consequences include the potential jail or prison term, fines, and any
other criminal punishment that a trial judge may impose after conviction. Almost everything else
is deemed 'collateral.' ").
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proportionality weakens their primary claim that retributivism is
superior to consequentialism.
A. Other Kinds of Proportionality
1. Close-Enough Proportionality
Jesper Ryberg notes that the whole business of proportionality
is a rough approximation:
[T]he imposition of inadvertent disproportionate punishment is indeed the most likely
result of any real life punishment system no matter how carefully it is designed. That a
person receives the punishment he deserves, that is, the one which is precisely
proportionate to the crime he has committed, will be the exception, not the rule.97
Perhaps, he suggests, we are obligated to "punish a criminal in such a
way that it is most reasonable to expect the punishment to be
proportionate to the crime."98 In other words, maybe proportionality
need only be close enough.
I have given examples, however, that do not depend on precise
determinations of proportionality. Cushy and Rough are knowingly
harmed to different degrees when they are placed in different
facilities. The inmate who has subclinical levels of claustrophobia is
knowingly harmed much more than the inmate who feels calmed by
confined quarters. The rich and poor offenders who are imprisoned
and forced to give up different property rights are knowingly worsened
to very different degrees. These examples show that the absurd
features of our proportionality intuitions do not arise out of the
difficulties of precisely assessing the severity of punishment. They
arise from the fact that we are not inclined to dispense harsh
treatment in proportion to blame even when we have all the relevant
facts. So we do not even aspire to follow Ryberg's suggestion to act in a
manner that makes it reasonable to expect proportional treatment.
2. Banded Proportionality
So far, I have focused on pure forms of proportionality that say
we should punish or harshly treat offenders in proportion to their
blameworthiness. Some subscribe to a weaker form of proportionality,
however, that merely requires imposing a sentence that is not
97. RYBERG, supra note 29, at 160.
98. Id. at 165-66.
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undeserved, meaning it is "neither too lenient [nor] too severe."99 Such
"banded" forms of proportionality do not mandate anything like a
precise relationship between blameworthiness and punishment
severity.
Indeed, one popular form of banded proportionality is the
"limiting retributivist" view that proportionality only places an upper
boundary on sentencing.100 Limiting retributivists may hold that there
is no affirmative duty to punish at all or that affirmative obligations to
punish come from nonretributive considerations like
consequentialism.10 Though the Justices of the Supreme Court are
hardly univocal in describing the "narrow proportionality principle"102
in the Eighth Amendment, 103 it has limiting retributivist overtones to
the extent that it only invalidates sentences that are "grossly
disproportionate to the severity of . . . crime[s]." 104
Since proportionality is a troublesome concept, any view that
relies on it less is correspondingly less troublesome. Suppose, for
example, that A and B are sentenced for conduct that warrants a
minimum of five years' and a maximum of fifteen years' incarceration
as experienced by average offenders in average prison facilities.
Suppose, too, that A and B each receive ten-year sentences. Now, even
though A and B will be in different facilities, experience their
conditions differently, and be worsened by incarceration to different
degrees, it is at least possible that when all of these features are
properly accounted for, neither offender's sentence violates the
constraints of banded proportionality. So even though we must still
measure harm using the methods I describe to ensure that sentences
stay within the permitted bands, banded proportionality will lead to
fewer proportionality violations.
99. MICHAEL TONRY, Interchangeability, Desert Limits, and Equivalence of Function, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 291, 292 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1998); see also
Norval Morris, Desert as a Limiting Principle, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra, at 180.
100. See RYBERG, supra note 29, at 192 (describing "limiting proportionalism").
101. Cf. DUFF, supra note 15, at 19 (distinguishing retributivists who "tell[ us only that we
may punish the guilty" from those who "hold[| that we ought to punish the guilty").
102. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).
103. Compare Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 ("[T]he Constitution does not mandate adoption of any
one penological theory," as a "sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation."), with id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("Proportionality-the notion that the punishment should fit the crime-is
inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of retribution.").
104. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (2003). "Outside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare," however. Id. at 272. According to the Court, the proportionality principle
"would ... come into play in the extreme example . . . if a legislature made overtime parking a
felony punishable by life imprisonment." Id. at 274 n.11.
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But even limited proportionality requirements do not avoid the
concerns I have raised, for precisely where banded proportionality
matters-around the bands-the counterintuitive implications creep
back in. Suppose in the previous example that A and B are sentenced
to fifteen years (the top of the band) instead of ten years, and replace
their names with Cushy and Rough, Sensitive and Insensitive, or
Freeman and Quarantine. In all of these cases, we reach the same
counterintuitive results described earlier.
If, for example, a rich person and an ordinary person commit
crimes of equal blameworthiness, it could be that the ordinary person
is appropriately sentenced to the maximum permissible punishment
but that the sentence is too severe for the rich person. Thus, banded
proportional harsh treatment leads to cases where rich people ought to
be in objectively less severe conditions than ordinary people, contrary
to the intuitions of most people. In precisely those circumstances
where banded proportionality matters-namely, around the bands-it
suffers from the same drawbacks as nonbanded proportionality.
3. Proportional Incapacitation
We can imagine a kind of proportionality that would explain
many of our intuitions in the difficult cases I describe. Under what we
could call the principle of "proportional incapacitation," an offender
should be incapacitated for a duration proportional to his
blameworthiness. Hence, even though Rough and Cushy are confined
in very different conditions, since they are equally blameworthy, they
should spend the same amount of time in prison. Similarly, even
though Sensitive and Insensitive experience prison differently, they
should nevertheless spend the same amount of time in confinement.
And finally, even though Freeman and Quarantine are worsened to
very different degrees by incarceration, they too should spend the
same amount of time confined.
Despite its surprising congruence with our punishment
intuitions, however, the principle of proportional incapacitation
enshrines what I earlier criticized as our "duration fetish": our focus
on the duration of sentences with little regard for the many other
factors that affect sentence severity.105 If one cares about common
retributivist ends like inflicting deserved suffering or deserved
deprivations of liberty, it makes no sense to focus exclusively on the
length of time a person is confined. For any period of confinement,
some will suffer a lot and some will suffer a little. Similarly, for any
105. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 4, at 1606-07.
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period of confinement, some may be deprived of a lot of liberty (in
prisons with austere conditions) or just a moderate amount of liberty
(in spacious prisons with lax restrictions). Moreover, merely focusing
on duration of confinement cannot account for the widely agreed-upon
differences in severity of solitary confinement, typical prisons, and
house arrest.
B. Consequentialism
Once we see that our punishment intuitions only loosely cohere
with retributivist proportionality, claims that retributivism better
matches our intuitions become suspect. In fact, many of our intuitions
that seem to be about proportionality can be explained surprisingly
well in consequentialist terms. As a general rule, consequentialists,
like proportionalists, will seek to incarcerate more blameworthy
offenders longer. More blameworthy offenders tend to be more
dangerous and warrant greater deterrence, longer incapacitation, and
longer or more intense rehabilitation.
Before addressing the larger battle between retributivism and
consequentialism, however, I begin by showing how pure
consequentialists can rather quickly resolve the mystery of credit for
time served.
1. Credit for Time Served
Just as they evaluate other policies, consequentialists should
consider the relative costs and benefits of giving credit for time served.
On the benefits side, the good consequences of pretrial and post-trial
incapacitation are likely to be quite similar. A day of detention
incapacitates about as well as a day of punitive confinement. There
may be some minor differences in terms of how much pretrial
detention deters or rehabilitates relative to punitive confinement, but
the differences are plausibly small. So as a rough-and-ready guide, we
expect that the benefits of confinement will largely be a function of its
duration and severity no matter whether we call it pretrial detention
or punitive confinement.
Consequentialists must also consider the costs of pretrial
detention relative to punitive confinement. Since pretrial detention
and punitive confinement both cause roughly similar levels of distress
and deprivation of liberty, most consequentialists treat them as
roughly the same for purposes of measuring harm caused. Similarly,
the financial costs to detain a person for a day or to imprison him for a
day are likely to be at least roughly comparable. Therefore,
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consequentialists need not draw much of a distinction between
pretrial detention and imprisonment on either the benefit side or the
harm side of the equation. Hence, consequentialists credit time spent
in pretrial detention because it serves essentially the same goals as
time spent incarcerated.
Of course, consequentialists can also explain why we do not
give offenders credit for time served in pretrial detention for crimes
unrelated to a current indictment. If we could store up time in pretrial
detention to count against future crimes, such a get-out-of-jail-free
card would mean that people could commit crimes without fear of any
harsh treatment. Doing so would surely frustrate consequentialist
goals. 106
I emphasize that all of this is a rough analysis because
painting the full consequentialist picture would require us to better
identify all of the pertinent harms and benefits of giving credit for
time served and to determine how to value them against each other.
We would need a careful study of the complicated differences in
behavior we would expect to see among judges, prosecutors, and
defendants in a world that gives credit relative to a world that does
not. To my knowledge, no one has conducted such a study. But there is
good reason to believe that consequentialists can justify credit for time
served and without much difficulty at that.
2. Measuring Harsh Treatment
I have argued that even when proportionality is understood as
a relationship between blame and harsh treatment, it still has very
counterintuitive implications. Consequentialists have no principled
commitment to proportionality, so they are not subject to the same
criticism. Like retributivists, however, they must measure and justify
the harms of criminal justice. Imprisoning offenders knowingly causes
them experiential harms and, more generally, causes harms measured
106. Consequentialists might even offer an interesting defense of our policy of giving credit
for time served but not compensating acquitted detainees. In a well-run criminal justice system,
most people charged with crimes actually committed them. Yet even in a well-run system, it will
often be difficult to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, many guilty people will be
acquitted. By confining some of the most dangerous offenders in pretrial detention, detention
provides at least a modest general deterrent against commission of these offenses, even when
they cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. To put the point more strongly, a system that
compensates acquitted detainees will have little deterrent effect on offenses that are very
difficult to prove at trial. Failing to credit acquitted detainees provides at least some deterrence.
If, however, our current system arrests and detains lots of innocent people, then consequentialist
considerations might actually counsel compensating acquitted detainees. Cf. Dan Markel & Eric
J. Miller, Bowling, As Bail Condition, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at A17 (criticizing judges who
have allegedly used bail conditions as surreptitious punishment).
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as changes from a baseline. To the extent that consequentialists fail to
appropriately measure and consider these harms, they fail to properly
conduct cost-benefit analyses and therefore fail to justify their
punishment practices.107
Consequentialists can justify some measurement failures on
the ground that the costs of measurement would exceed the
benefits.108 They can also argue that, right or wrong, laypeople
understand punishment severity in ways that ignore experiences and
baselines and that there would be bad effects if we punish in ways
that deviate so substantially from lay expectations. 109 Some scholars
have even argued that people are less likely to comply with legal
systems that do not conform with their deep-seated beliefs.110
By way of example, in many apartment buildings, the
thirteenth floor is labeled the fourteenth floor because some people
believe the number thirteen is unlucky. Though such beliefs are just
superstition, it would be foolish when considering resale value to
entirely ignore the beliefs of future buyers. Similarly, even though
consequentialists do not endorse proportional intuitions, they may
sometimes be warranted in acting as though those intuitions have
merit. Still, consequentialists must at least approximate the
magnitude of the harms they cause; otherwise, they cannot be
confident that the benefits they obtain exceed their costs.
107. Consequentialists must also take offenders' anticipated subjective experiences of
punishment into account in order to optimize deterrence. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra
note 4, at 217-18, n.101. Miriam Baer argues that consequentialists can also improve deterrent
effects by differentially distributing enforcement resources and claims that I dismiss this
possibility. Miriam H. Baer, Evaluating the Consequences of Calibrated Sentencing: A Response
to Professor Kolber, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 11, 13 n.10 (2009). Rather than dismissing it,
however, I merely made the simplifying assumption that individually calibrating enforcement
resources was not a viable option. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 218 n.101.
Surely, however, both the probability of detection and the expected harms of punishment affect
the decisions of rational actors to break the law, so consequentialists could try to calibrate both
sentences and probabilities of detection. Importantly, however, calibrating enforcement
resources based on offender sensitivity will not relieve consequentialists of the obligation to
measure experiential harms for purposes of justifying the harsh treatment we inflict.
108. Retributivists might offer a similar excuse, though they are less likely than
consequentialists to explicitly state how to trade off cost and punishment goals. See Michael T.
Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 820 (2007). Moreover,
some failures to measure may violate the common retributivist requirement to never knowingly
or recklessly overpunish particular individuals. Cf. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 21, at 102
n.33.
109. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 4, at 236.
110. See generally Adam J. Kolber, How to Improve Empirical Desert, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 433
(2010) (challenging defenders of "empirical desert" who advocate making laws better conform
with lay intuitions).
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3. The Retributive Superiority Claim
As I noted earlier, proportionality is often considered one of the
biggest attractions of retributivism relative to consequentialism. 1 'u
For example, some have argued that, under certain circumstances,
consequentialism might advise us to hang pickpockets or even people
who double park.112 Such circumstances are hard to imagine in the
real world since the harms of such policies are so enormous relative to
their likely benefits. It is true, though, that consequentialism could
endorse draconian treatment under some imaginable circumstances.
Now we see how proportional retributivism also has strange
consequences but in much more ordinary circumstances: Proportional
punishment requires us to abandon the popular policy of giving credit
for time served and provides no justification for the unintended
harmful side effects of punishment. Proportional harsh treatment
requires us to give more dangerous offenders shorter sentences than
we give equally blameworthy but less dangerous offenders who are
confined in better facilities. It also leads us to give rich people shorter
sentences or better conditions than we give equally blameworthy
ordinary people.
Finally, the most devastating attack on proportionality comes
from the baseline challenge. Consider those whose baseline quality of
life is just a little better than it is in prison. For such people, true
proportional harsh treatment would mean imprisoning them for an
exceptionally long time or in prison conditions that are especially
unpleasant or restrictive. Yet few have the intuition that doing so is
appropriate. Thus, unlike the farfetched circumstances meant to
embarrass consequentialists-where executing pickpockets and
parking violators is said to maximize good consequences-I have
demonstrated counterintuitive implications of proportionality in real-
world settings that arise on a daily basis.
CONCLUSION
One way to resolve the mystery of credit for time served is to
understand sentence severity in terms of harsh treatment rather than
punishment. But when we apply principles of proportionality to this
more enlightened understanding of sentence severity, we generate odd
111. See supra note 18.
112. Larry Alexander, The Doomsday Machine: Proportionality, Punishment and Prevention,
63 MONIST 199, 209 (1980) (noting the pickpocket example); Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen,
For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
Soc'Y OF LONDON B 1775 (2004) (noting the parking violation example).
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consequences that are generally overlooked. Those consequences are
not always visible because sentencing is such a messy business to
begin with. But when we examine the underlying machinery of
proportionality, we see that the strange consequences are always
there.
Antony Duff argues that "[a] philosophical account of the
justification of punishment is not refuted merely by the fact that it
does not match or justify existing systems of punishment." 13 The aim
of a punishment justification, he claims, "is not to describe, or to
justify, punishment as it actually is, but to describe and justify
punishment as it ought to be."114 Yet my critique of proportionality
applies not only to our actual punishment practices but to any
punishment practices proportionalists can plausibly imagine
implementing. Inmates will always vary in their conditions of
confinement, their sensitivity to those conditions, and their
unpunished baselines.
Our failure to implement true proportional harsh treatment is
not solely due to cost and administrative difficulties. Most people
would find true proportional harsh treatment quite objectionable. So
even if we revise the concept of proportionality so that it accurately
measures harsh treatment, we are still left with an unappealing basis
for distributing punishment.
A full-fledged defense of consequentialism is beyond the scope
of this Article. I have demonstrated, however, that consequentialists
can give a rough-and-ready justification for crediting time served.
More importantly, familiar arguments that consequentialism leads to
disproportionality are now suspect, given that the forms of
proportionality retributivists aspire to achieve are themselves
disproportional when punishment severity is properly analyzed.
Indeed, proportional harsh treatment often leads to results more
outlandish than those attributed to consequentialism. So even if we
actually knew how to determine what punishments are proportional to
what crimes-and surely we do not-proportionality has such
counterintuitive implications that it should not serve as the moral
foundation for just punishment.
113. Antony Duff, Retributive Punishment-Ideals and Actualities, 25 ISR. L. REV. 422, 423
(1991).
114. Id.
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Governing the Anticonmons in
Aggregate Litigation
D. Theodore Rave 66 Vand. L. Rev. 1183 (2013)
This Article argues that there is an "anticommons" problem
in aggregate litigation. An anticommons occurs when the consent of
too many owners is needed to use a resource at its most efficient
scale. When many plaintiffs have similar claims against a common
defendant, those claims are often worth more if they can be bundled
up and sold to the defendant (i.e., settled) as a single package-that
is, the defendant may be willing to pay a premium for total peace.
But because the rights to control those claims are dispersed among
the individual plaintiffs, transaction costs and strategic holdouts
can make aggregation difficult, particularly in cases where class
actions are impractical. Recently the American Law Institute ('ALI")
proposed modifying long-standing legal ethics rules governing
nonclass aggregate settlements to allow plaintiffs to agree in
advance to be bound by a supermajority vote on a group settlement
offer. By shifting from individual control over settlement decisions to
collective decisionmaking, the ALI proposal may offer a way out of
the anticommons dynamic and allow the group to capture the peace
premium. Critics, however, say that allowing plaintiffs to surrender
their autonomy will leave them vulnerable to exploitation by their
lawyers and by the majority. Viewed through the lens of the
anticommons, these concerns are manageable. Similar anticommons
problems arise in many areas of law, ranging from eminent domain
to oil and gas to sovereign debt. But instead of slavishly preserving
the autonomy of individual rights holders, these areas of law have
developed strategies for aggregating rights when doing so will result
in joint gains. Drawing from these other contexts, this Article argues
that the legitimacy of compelling individuals to participate in a
value-generating aggregation depends on the presence of governance
procedures capable of protecting the interests of the individuals
within the collective and ensuring that the gains from cooperation
are fairly allocated. Governance is thus the key to legitimizing
attempts to defeat the anticommons in mass litigation through
aggregation, whether by regulatory means, such as the class action,
or contractual precommitment, as in the ALIproposal.
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